Posts Tagged loot system

Arouse in the Other Person an Eager Want

This article is part of the series “How To Win /friends and Influence /guildies”.  See the introduction for more.

If you’re reading the original book alongside, this corresponds to Part 1, Chapter 3: “He Who Can Do This Has the Whole World with Him.  He Who Cannot Walks a Lonely Way”

If there is any one secret of success, it lies in the ability to get the other person’s point of view and see things from that person’s angle as well as from your own.

Henry Ford

The principle behind this rather long-named chapter is really quite simple, and eloquently summed up in the above quote.  There is only one way to get someone to do something, and that is to make them want to do it.

To do that, you have to talk about what they want, and not about what you want.   For a raid or guild leader, these should nominally be the same thing, at least at a high level.  Whatever your guild’s purpose is, that’s what everyone is showing up for – PvE progression, PvP dominance, or clean hard mode execution for example.

I won’t go into the examples that Carnegie uses in this chapter, as they’re all very business-oriented and somewhat dated.  Instead, let’s look at some situations in which you might be trying to win your members or an individual member to your side.

In a Raid

An impassioned plea for people to focus on the next boss attempt usually come after the basic “here’s how the fight goes, let’s give it a try” approach has failed.  You’re pretty sure that everyone understands the mechanics, but the execution is just going awry at some point.  You may even understand who’s going off the rails first, but know that calling them out won’t make things any better.

In this context, you probably are going to be talking to your raid as a whole or to roles within the raid.  What wants can you appeal to?  The most obvious are the material rewards from the boss, but this only works if the boss has intrinsic value to the raid.  Sometimes you get unexpectedly blocked by a boss that you’ve had on farm for a while.  The loot is no longer appealing, at least not to most of the raid.  You can appeal to everyone’s desire to just be done with the fight – perhaps asking certain roles to double-up and keep an eye out for people who you suspect are not focusing closely enough.

If the boss is linked to trash that is particularly annoying to clear, you can appeal to everyone’s desire to not repeat that the next night.  This is effective when people are requesting to move to another boss in a non-linear dungeon.  Do you remember pushing extra hard for a Shade of Aran kill in the early days of TBC just because of how painful it was to clear the trash after Curator?

If none of these seem appropriate or are having effect, you can drop one level lower and appeal to people’s desire for loot in the future (assuming you have a loot system that can offer bonuses).  It may seem cheap or compromising to have to offer bonus DKP or EP to get people to do what they should have been doing all through the raid.  Ideally, this is a last resort offered to encourage people to stay beyond a posted raid end or to go all-out on consumables in order to push progression.  Offering strictly material bonuses regularly dilutes their value.

I know we’re all fed up of this boss, especially since he went down so easily the last few weeks.  It’s late, and we all want to wrap up.  But I’m sure nobody wants to spend an extra 20 minutes slogging through that trash again tomorrow night.

I know we can do this, and I’m sure you all do too.  Let’s take five minutes to clear our heads, then come back and take him down.  1000 bonus EP if we do it without anyone dying in phase 2.

(more) One-on-One...

Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Performance-Based Loot Systems

STRONGMAN Performance Based Loot Systems

While browsing the US guild relations forum, I was struck by this post: PerLoot – a new Loot System

Not struck by the brilliance of the system, mind, but the process by which a reasonable goal (rewarding people who perform better) fell apart in the implementation.  What’s worse is that the original poster didn’t seem to realize how much things had fallen apart.

In summary, the poster proposed a loot system whose rewards were based upon performance in raids.  The better you perform, the more loot you get.  They proposed to measure performance by the meters – your DPS divided by your GearScore times the cubic root of the number of dispels or interrupts you perform.  The post made no allowance for how tanks would be handled, but did say that they would gauge Discipline priests differently “because they heal by prevention”.

The premise that gave birth to this loot system is attractive: ultimately, loot distribution should reward those who perform well.   I’m sure most people who generally perform above the average of their raid feel they should be rewarded for doing so.  But the loot system as proposed fails on so many levels.

(more) How Do You Fail Me?

Tags: , , , , , , ,

Principles vs Pragmatism

principles pragmatism Principles vs Pragmatism

Another article inspired by a comment on the last article, this time from Veliaf of der Hexenmeister.

Veliaf asked how to deal with the situation where your policies require you to treat everyone fairly, yet some people are more important to the success of the raid.  I think it was implied was that the people who are more important to the raid try to take advantage of that situation.  Let’s invent a hypothetical situation that you might face as guild leader to give the discussion some focus:

Foo and Bar are your progression tanks.  They’ve both very well geared and know their classes well.  They’ve been tanking since vanilla WoW, and when you throw them at content, you know things are going to go smoothly.  But as a new patch approaches, they’ve slipped into maintenance mode, where they just show up right before invites, do the raid, then log off.  There is nothing left for them to reasonably work towards until the next tier of content is released.

Quux is your third tank.  He used to be DPS, but changed his main spec to tanking a few months ago.  His gear is a little worse than Foo and Bar, but he’s very active in the guild – helping others, farming materials, researching class mechanics, and generally doing everything he can to improve himself.

Foo begins to miss raids from time, which doesn’t hurt your regular raids too much.  Bar steps up and Quux fills in the second tank role.  Sometimes things don’t go quite as smoothly, but you manage.  After a few weeks, Foo disappears entirely.  Quux keeps tanking, and gets his gear up to a level which while not on par with Foo and Bar is easily enough to tank the next tier of content.

The patch drops, and magically Foo appears online for the first scheduled raid of the new content, with no explanation for the absence.  He expects to be the designated MT for the first night of the new raid.  Now you’re faced with a dilemma.  Foo still has slightly better gear than Quux, and has a better innate feel for fights.  But Foo abandoned the guild when it no longer offered him upgrades.  While you don’t have a specific policy that covers this situation, you have established an expectation in your members that dedication to the guild and performance are rewarded.

Who’s The Tank?

Who do you put in the MT spot?  The person who will make things go more smoothly for the first night of a new raid, or the person who stepped to the plate when the guild needed him, and is ready to continue doing so?  Would your decision be influenced if you knew that Foo was likely to throw a temper tantrum and possibly gquit if you didn’t put them in the MT role?

The principled decision is easy: you reward the person who has helped the guild and shows promise to continue doing so.  If you lose Foo as a member, so be it.  Bar and Quux stay as your main tanks and you recruit a new third tank.  But this leaves you without a geared third tank, and since some fights in the new content require three tanks, you may stonewall progression.  You also have no wiggle room should Foo or Quux be unable to attend a raid.

The pragmatic approach is to give the MT spot back to Foo and demote Quux to third tank again.  While they’ll get to tank on the fights that require three, they’ll be relegated to DPS for most of the other content.  Their only hope for advancement in the guild tanking corps is for Foo to take another unannounced vacation.  Will the new raid go more smoothly?  Probably.  But you’ll have broken the implicit contract between you and your members: performance and dedication no longer guarantee reward, and selfish behaviour is tolerated if you’re a critical member of the raid.

To extend our hypothetical situation:

A month down the road, a similar situation arises with a DPS player.  You easily fill the empty spot with a new recruit who is equally geared and who puts out equal DPS.  When the original member returns, they cite the example of Foo as reason that they should get their spot back.  Do you give it to them, compounding the problem you created earlier?  Or do you return to principles, denying the returning playing a first-line spot on the raid team and cementing the double standard?

As Veliaf suggested, the situation could be even more extreme: Quux might not exist – you might have had to PUG an under-geared replacement tank during Foo’s absence, and not giving Foo the MT role back might mean that you can’t raid at all.

I’ve been purposefully hyperbolic in this example.  Rarely are the positions so clear cut, nor your decisions so polar.  The underlying problem is quite real however – your policies represent what you’d like things to be like in an ideal world, but the real world rarely plays by these rules.  Every day you may find yourself having to bend or break your own policies for the greater good of the guild.  But if you’re doing that regularly, why have policies at all?

To Punish, Penalize or Let Slide

So how do you deal with situations like this?  First, figure out what you’re trying to do.  Do you feel a need to punish Foo?  If so, what will that achieve?  Instead of punishment, are you instead looking to make them realize that they aren’t a linch pin of the guild?  Perhaps a more aggressive tanking rotation, where Quux would be placed in the MT position regularly might achieve this without being a formal punishment.

If challenged, you can justify such an action by saying that you need to ensure the guild always has two first-line capable tanks.  This might create some friction between you and Foo, but probably not enough to force a quit – they can’t exactly deny that they left the guild hanging, can they?  If they do get childish and threaten to quit, then they’ve tipped their hand – they are more interested in their own importance within the guild than with the guild’s ability to take on content.

A more aggressive rotation benefits you in two ways: Foo’s importance is reduced while Quux’s is increased.  You’re sending a message to the tanks (and your members) that the contract still stands, and so long as you’re fulfilling your side of the bargain, you’ll have a place as a tank on a regular basis.  This will help if the biggest issue for you was to not insult Quux by relegating them back to a DPS role.

Penalties and Bonuses in your loot system can also help here, though it helps if you’ve put them in place ahead of time.  Perhaps you have a penalty for leaving the guild hanging – a forced pass on the next mainspec drop they are present for.  Or you might have a reward for people who step up into a critical role when the guild needs them.

If punishment is your goal, consider whether you have the support of the guild.  This has greater weight if you’re contemplating punishment that isn’t explicitly laid out in your policies.  Any time you invoke your “I’m the guild leader and I say so” power, you need to know that the majority of the guild is behind you.  If not, you may have to bite your tongue this time and consider a policy change that would allow you to apply the punishment as a matter of course next time.

Plan Ahead

If you haven’t yet run into a situation like this, now might be the time to alter your policies to reflect the chance.  If you don’t already have an attendance requirement, consider adding one.  If someone misses three-quarters of the raids in a month, they need to have perfect attendance for the month following their return before they get first pick for raids.  If you don’t want to apply an attendance requirement across the board, you could put one in that only deals with extremes: if your actions prevent the guild from raiding, you’ll have to warm the bench for two weeks when you return.

These types of policies are tricky, because they tend to affect tanks and healers more than DPS.  Though the policy applies to everyone equally, the chances of running afoul of it are higher the more important you are to the raid.  If your reward system already favors tanks and healers, such as a loot council system where they get gear first, then you have an easier time implementing this policy.  The guild rewards you more, so the expectations of you are higher too.

Another idea is to have a hybrid penalty system that benches people where appropriate, but applies loot penalties where it is not.  I think of this like getting a parking or speeding ticket: you can choose to go to court and fight (taking up your time) or pay a fine to settle the matter immediately.  For the purposes of discussion, ignore that in many jurisdictions you can request a trial and never get one due to court backlog.

Applying a policy like that to our hypothetical situation might result in Foo being given the choice upon his return: either let Bar and Quux tank, with you on standby or in the 3rd tank position for fights that need it, or pay a loot penalty (a loss of a percentage of your points, a forced pass, etc.).  This forces the member to assume responsibility for whatever led to the punishment.

Would You Sacrifice Progression for Stability?

Ideally, you prevent people from becoming linch pins in the first place by aggressively rotating members through roles so that no one person is head and shoulders above the rest.  This will slow your progression, but provide a buffer against someone being absent.  If you’re an average raiding guild and you have the extra people to support it, this may be the safest route to take.  For anyone in a competitive progression guild gunning for server firsts, it’s just not an option.  Getting to the top first and staying there requires more dedication from your members, end of discussion.

Managing such a guild also requires that you look beyond gear and even beyond skill and catch a glimpse of how loyal someone will be to the guild under pressure?  Will they be there when the guild needs them and take responsibility for their actions if they’re not?  If the answer is no, you may need to address that gap or replace them before you wind up in a situation where you need to punish them for leaving the guild hanging.

I’d really like to hear from people who have gone through situations like this.  Are my suggestions too principled?  Can you just let absences like this slide, and nobody in the guild cares because they get to continue raiding?  Have you not punished someone and been criticised by members who feel that punishment was called for?

Until Next Time

Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,

Managing Your Loot Standings

inflation Managing Your Loot Standings

When comparing loot systems, pay special attention to how easy it is for established players who raid often to gain a massive point lead over new members or those who can’t raid as often.  While attendance needs to factor into buying power, certain systems are more susceptible than others.

There are two different problems, depending on whether your loot system has fixed prices or not: inflation and list camping.

Inflation affects systems where the cost of an item is driven by player bidding.  For whatever reason, one or several players have very large point balances.  The going rate for drops rises because the person with a high balance can easily beat anyone who is new.  People with low balances don’t even have the chance to compete – they could bid their entire balance of points and still have that only equal 1/10th or 1/5th of the balance of an established raider.

List Camping tends to affect systems where item prices are fixed.  For the same reasons, someone ends up with a large point balance, so that they have first pick of anything that drops.  When they want an item, they get it at the fixed price, but it doesn’t make much of an impact on their balance.  They essentially stay at the top of the list forever, and when new tiers of content are released, they get geared up first because they keep getting first pick.

That your members will take advantage of these situations isn’t a given.  I’ve been in some guilds where people with high balances sometimes feel guilty for always getting first pick, and deferred to lower-geared players to benefit the raid.  But this relies on magnanimous behaviour, which also isn’t a given.  If the person decides to, they can grab a ton of gear, and it’s not unheard of for people in this situation to do just that in the days and weeks leading up to a /gquit.

Before I talk about ways to address this, let’s look at a few of the common loot systems and the extent to which they are susceptible to these problems.

DKP with Fixed Costs

DKP with fixed costs is susceptible to list camping once you have all the gear you need from the current content.  If the loot system continues without a reset through multiple content patches, the lead someone has can become insurmountable.

DKP with Open Bidding

DKP with open bidding is susceptible to inflation, as a well-geared member can gain points while never bidding on gear.  If members collude to keep prices low (say an under the table deal to allow one person to pick up an item at the minimum bid price), then it can be susceptible to list camping as well.  While this system allows for the greatest level of flexibility for members, it is also the easiest to corrupt.

Zero-Sum DKP

Zero-sum DKP is not susceptible to inflation (as the number of total points in the system remains constant), but it can be susceptible to list camping.  Just how susceptible depends on whether you combine zero-sum with open bids or fixed costs.  While this may make zero-sum DKP sound attractive, the major failing of this system is the inability to provide rewards for anything other than loot dropping.  Without a way to incentivize progression content, zero-sum can be very demoralizing after a night of wipes.  It is better suited to farm content, but I’ve seen many guilds choose to go directly from their primary loot system to open /roll rather than maintain a parallel zero-sum system for lower-level content.

EP/GP

EP/GP is protected against both list camping and inflation, as the points you receive for raiding (EP) are not directly used for purchasing gear (only to rank people in priority order).  In addition, weekly decay of both EP and GP means that the larger the gap between high and low ranked members, the more that is lost during decay.   This discourages list camping – with a 10% decay, it takes just seven weeks to remove half of your EP and GP.  As any regular reader will know, I’m a big fan of this system because it doesn’t share the downsides of the other loot systems (though it does have it’s own cons, including the inability to spend what you feel an item is worth to you regardless of your priority).

Ni Karma

Ni Karma is a “boosted roll” system, in which your points can be used to supplement your roll if you so choose.  There are no item prices, so inflation is not a problem, but you can end up with people at the top of the list after a long period of taking no loot.  Due to the way in which the points are used (a winning boosted roll halves your balance), you can only effectively camp the list for one item.  Unfortunately, this can lead to people not taking minor upgrades because they are focused on winning the one item they really want and want to save their points.

Suicide Kings

Suicide Kings is not subject to inflation, as nobody has a balance, just a relative position on a list.  When you take loot, you drop to the bottom of the list of people who are in the raid (not the absolute bottom of the list).  Like Ni Karma, this can result in list camping for one particularly desired item, as once loot is taken you aren’t likely to get another piece right away.  I don’t see this system being used very much, as it has the same “lack of progression incentives” as zero-sum DKP (and can in fact be called a “zero-sum spend-all” system).

Suicide Kings doesn’t tend to be as popular as it was when first introduced, as the “cost” of an item (such as it is in this system) varies based upon who attends a given raid.  While this is also true of open-bid DKP, Suicide Kings doesn’t give members the level of power they have in open-bid DKP, which makes this downside more glaring.

(more) Reining things in...

Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,

GDKP – Where Does It Fit For Guilds?

gdkp run GDKP   Where Does It Fit For Guilds?

A few weeks ago, an article was posted on Elitist Jerks detailing the GDKP loot system.  Since then a few other blogs (Pwnwear, Deathknight.info) have picked up on the idea and spread it around.

I was hoping to provide a bit of an overview and practical suggestions for organizing GDKP runs, but as that’s been done to death I’m going to look at where GDKP can fit into a guild’s loot strategy.

What is GDKP?

A quick refresher: GDKP is a loot system where every item is bid for openly using gold.  Highest bid wins, and at the end of the run everyone splits the pot.

The name is a bit a misnomer, as there are no “dragon kill points” involved.  DKP, EP/GP, Ni Karma – all of these loot systems are closed.  You earn points within the system that you then use in some fashion to receive loot.  No matter what you’ve done before, when you enter into a new DKP system, you’re starting from scratch.

GDKP runs on the other hand implicitly favour people who have a lot of gold, at least from the perspective of getting drops.  But interestingly, GDKP doesn’t solely attract people who are interested in loot.  You can be dressed to the nines with no need of any drop in a dungeon and come out the other side with a tidy sum of gold in your pocket.

Who Is It For?

GDKP attracts three distinct types of players: low-geared members who are willing to spend a reasonable amount on multiple pieces of gear during a run, high rollers who want just one item and are willing to spend large amounts to get it, and people who are just there for the gold.

For the right balance of performance and payout, you probably want no more than 40% low-geared members, 40% people looking for a payout and the rest high rollers.  Depending on just how under-geared the lowbies are, you may need to set more strict gear and experience limits on the rest of the players in order to avoid hitting enrage timers.  Similarly, you can’t go overboard on the people who are just there for the payout or the total gear purchased will be low (as will the payout).

Unlike forming a PUG run where warm bodies are your first concern, building a GDKP run is a balancing act.  Don’t try starting one up on a whim – you need to announce it, review people who are interested, and build a group that serves the needs of everyone attending.

Lowbies Buying Loot For Gold Is Wrong!

Perhaps.  But it’s been going on for a very long time.  Even before Zul’Aman bear runs (costing 15 to 25 thousand gold if I recall correctly) were popular on most servers, there were always guilds who were willing to carry people through higher-level content for a hefty amount of gold.  The difference was that they typically brought one or two people at a time as part of a regularly scheduled guild farm run.  The gold usually went back into the guild bank, and members saw the benefit in that the guild could afford to pay for more repairs or for gems / enchants / etc.

GDKP is just one variant of this.  It’s a framework for doing PUG loot runs that will hopefully become common knowledge.  All you need to do is announce that you’re doing a GDKP run and specify the tuneables: minimum bid amounts, rules for getting kicked, etc.

(more) GDKP as a primary loot system...

Tags: , , , , ,